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The SOE reform in China/周大勇

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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.



社会改革与法律秩序

检察日报2000年02月03日
  社会改革与法律秩序的关系十分密切。如何在法律秩序下实现社
会改革,如何在社会改革中建立并维持新的法律秩序,是摆在社会学
家和法学家面前的难题,也是社会改革家和法律实践家的责任。
  法律秩序是启动社会改革的先导。改革者常常在社会改革之初就
创设新的法律秩序,然后运用新的法律秩序来推行改革。在社会改革
中,首先变革法律秩序,并用这种新的法律秩序来启动社会改革,既
可以使社会改革依法进行,也可以避免“先改革后立法”的弊端,更
可以避免违宪改革或违法改革。即使是由民众推动的改革,如果没有
法律上的根据,改革的推进及其合法性都会成为问题。如果放任违法
改革存在,就必然在或多或少的程度上破坏法治。
  法律秩序是推进社会改革的基础。如果社会改革是由权力层启动
的,那么权力层就应当首先运用立法手段将自己的改革意图法律化。
如果改革是由社会民众发动的,改革行为也应当有一定的法律根据。
即使是一种迫不得已的改革,一旦为国家所认可,也应当立即予以立
法确认,建立新的法律秩序。改革成果如果不能被转化为法律秩序,
不能被纳入法律秩序的范畴受保护,改革就可能受阻,改革的成果也
可能得而复失。法律秩序确认社会改革的成果,也为社会改革新的发
展提供了新的立足点,同时,还可以使社会改革不至于在改革的道路
上失落自我或无所依归。
  法律秩序可克服社会改革带来的震荡。社会改革必然会有阻力、
有震荡。如果震荡过大,就可能引发社会动乱。而任何社会动乱,就
其本身来说都是社会的疾患。它可能使社会的发展出现梗阻,使社会
的脚步被迫倒退,使社会的文明遭到损害,走向社会改革目标的反面,
甚至葬送社会改革本身。如果建立并保持了良好的法律秩序,使社会
改革在法律秩序中进行,就不可能引发过大的社会震荡,即使引发了,
改革者也能采取有效的法律措施予以控制。
  法律秩序既是静态的模式,也是动态的过程。法律秩序要在社会
中发展更新,需要一定的社会动力。在若干社会动力之中,改革无疑
是最强大的力量。在社会改革中,法律秩序确认、维护、推进着社会
改革的同时,自己也获得新的形式和新的内容。社会改革的不断发展,
会对法律秩序提出不断更新的要求。法律秩序的发展也是社会改革发
展的要求。社会不同方面的改革会引发法在不同方面的发展,一旦改
革进行了,原有的法就存在过时、需要革新的问题。法所作出的与社
会改革相适应的变革,也会引起相应的法律秩序变革。在社会改革——
法的变革——法律秩序变革的过程中,法律秩序发展了,更新了,新
的法律秩序就会建立并走向新的完善。



商法的精神
——从商人法到现代商法的转变析商法存在的意义

胡颖廉


精神,魂也。人之具精神乃人当立于世上之根基,物之具精神乃物可尽其效用之根本。国家有国家的精神,民族有民族的精神,精神实为一物别与它物而存于世间之依据。浩浩千年,洋洋万里,殆乎鲜有无精神的事物。法,当亦有其精神。
何为法之精神?两百五十年前,法国启蒙思想家孟德斯鸠的那部不朽名著似乎都在回答着这个问题——“制约权力和维护权利”1。可见,法的精神来源于其强制的规范性,这也正是法区别于诸多意识、行为规范而立于社会之源泉。也正是因为有权力与权利之分,才有公法与私法之存,本文要探讨的对象正是作为司法领域之一的部门法——商法。
商法。在我们关注这个词时,首先想到的就是何为“商”。古人提出“通财鬻货曰商”2这种理解是将“商”视为买卖,是人们对“商”最朴素的认识,而近现代经济的发展,人们已将营利视为“商”的本质3。即以营利为目的的各种商品交易行为。这里的“营利”是广义的,区别于经济学上的具有局限性的“商”。由于“商业从一开始就是和追求利润最大化联系在一起的,由于买卖双方中一方利润的增加必然造成另一方利润的减少,因此商业所产生的第一个后果就是交易双方在利害关系上完全敌对和相互不信任,以及为这种互不信任的辩护,并采取不道德的手段来达到不道德的目的。”4因此,正如上文所述,法律“维护权利”的精神(抑或作用)便显现了,从法律制度层面保证“以营利为目的的交易行为”的顺利、可靠、安全,这也构成了商法精神的基本轮廓。
但问题似乎还不是那么简单的,保障交易秩序何以成为“商法”的专利?交易秩序的保护仅有商法就够了吗?……这一系列的问题所涉及的实际是商法存在的功能、价值和意义,本文将从历史和逻辑的统一(the unity of history and logic)来对此进行剖析。
现代商法是由欧洲中世纪的商人法演化发展而来的,这是一个不争的事实。所谓商人法,是“中世纪期间有关商人、商业事务的习惯法规和原则的总称”5,因此,商人法是一个历史形成的概念,是对历史上形成的商人习惯法的总称。由于欧洲中世纪政治、宗教等因素的影响,致使商业行为不被主流社会的意识形态所认可,商业活动无法获得当时的既有法律保护。但商业在地中海沿岸或者整个欧洲大陆的复兴,需要有调整商人活动的规范,因此商人自发的从罗马法的万民法中寻求依据,并且直接适用到中世纪的商业活动中。从我们对商人法的历史考察中可以得知,商人法的产生和发展,无不贯穿着实事求是、务实创新和自治自律的精神。“商人法以商人习惯或商事习惯法的形式出现,体现的是商人共同意志,而未掺入国家意志。商人即市民,商人法的形成与近代市民社会理念的勃兴,强调市民社会与政治国家严格分野,经济活动是市民社会的私事,国家不得干预的理念也是密切相关的。”6在封建庄园经济和教会占统治地位的背景下,为了保护自身特殊利益,不被封建主和教会所压迫而寻求特殊的法7,在政治上取得自治地位的商人便为自己争得了商人法。“当然商人永远以实用为本,而非至纯的理想主义者。他们为了巩固自治地位、谋求行业垄断、藉助封建国家的力量拓展市场,需要与封建主和国王们合作,封建国家也需要利用商人的经济力量,何况统治者对黄金的追求与商人对利润的向往并无本质分别。于是商人法逐渐变成国家认可和制定的国法。”8可见,商人法的意义正在于中世纪商人为自己的行为所设定的法律框架,是商业贸易实践的发展形成商人阶层在意识形态上无法得到当时主流社会承认的情况下,在自己组织自治的商业城市中实践的商人习惯发展而来的,其根本的渊源应该是罗马法中的万民法,但是商人法又根据当时的商业实践需要进行了改革。因此商人法的发展是自然的,是一种务实创新精神的突出体现。其存在还对资本主义经济的发展起到了极大的推动作用。
随着资本主义经济的发展和商人法的发达,商人阶层的壮大呈现非常明显的趋势。最为直接的表现就是在经历了数个世纪的发展以后,商人法由习惯法逐渐发展成为被封建政权承认的法律,获得了在法院或者法庭适用的资格,从而商法的发展走到了一个新的阶段。商人不再受歧视和憎恨,阶级关系和社会观念的变化使得商法的作用,进而是其精神,发生了巨变。
历史的脚步踏入了近代,尽管作为资本主义商法典开山之作的《法国商法典》完全是为满足法国对外侵略战争的要求,解决军火供应方面的问题,由拿破仑一怒之下制定的,本身就缺乏对商的理性认识,从而饱受批评和争议,但作为实质意义的商法本身,其存在的价值是不容置疑的。上面关于商法历史的分析告诉我们,正是由于中世纪商业的蓬勃发展和商品经济的发达,才促使了商人这一根本有别于封建经济条件下经济主体的新型社会主体的产生,才有了独立的商人阶层的出现,进而才有了较之教会法和其它世俗法更为先进合理,也更能促进商品经济发展,同时也有别于传统民法的商事立法的诞生。商法之于民法的独立与其看作是对商人这一新的特殊利益主体的保护,毋宁看作是对社会经济现实的反映和保护。“至于十九世纪末二十世纪初西方各国的商事立法及其法典化,则更是西方自由商品经济发展和民主宪政制度确立的结果。成文法运动本身就决不是历史偶然,而是由当时的经济、社会背景所决定的,是法制文明史的必经阶段和必由之路。”9
商法在当代的社会地位又应当如何评价呢?让我们首先来考察民法与商法的关系。“如果说道德规范的本质体现在民法中,那么我们可以说营利的本质体现在商法的规定中。”10从基本精神来看,民法可以概括为自由、平等、博爱,而商法则可以归纳为自由、平等、安全。从这一点出发,我们可以看到商法不同于民法之处,也能体会出商法的基本精神??确保交易顺利、可靠、安全。如何理解呢?保障交易的顺利(抑或便捷),包括了简便性与迅捷性。细而言之,商法中的契约定型化、短期时效、权利证券化、程序简易化等制度保证了商事交易的简捷性。以契约定型化和短期时效为例,“在市场经济条件下,商事主体的营业无不是为了营利,而要达到此目的,就必须使交易迅速,只有这样,商事主体才能在尽可能短的时间内进行多次反复的交易。”11与之对应的则是商法的自由价值。法律是“自由的科学(the science of liberty),为了保障自由,我们才是法律的奴仆。”商法基于相信商事主体可以设想为理性人、经济人,其个人理性、最大化的个人利益能够合成集体理性、社会利益的最大化。虽然许多学者批评这种理论假设,但我认为商法是相信而非迷信这种认识,与现实偏差完全可以利用商法内部的结构制约和外部的经济法平衡来调整。经济法的基础假设是怀疑主体理性不周延,而引入国家权力在一定程度上一定范围内限制经济主体自由以弥补市场缺陷,因此市场经济需要经济法和商法相互配合,协调一致的共同作用,而自由价值的取舍是二者区别之一。
其次是保障交易的安全性。如前所述,简易、迅捷是现代商事交易的特性和要求,但与此同时,交易的安全性更令人关注。现代商事活动中,随着交易手段的愈益复杂,交易标的的愈益巨大,交易频率的愈益加快,交易范围的愈益扩大,交易风险增加,交易的安全性便也愈益突出与重要:商法创立了如公示主义、外观主义、严格责任主义等一系列制度以适应这一要求,确保交易安全。这一要求又对应商法的秩序价值。在一定意义上讲法律就是秩序,推及商事领域即商法就是商事秩序,市场经济本质上是自由经济,市场主体的自由是市场机制运作的核心要求,但主体首先是经济人,其次才是理性人,在追逐利益最大化的过程中,主体往往表现为有限理性;或者在市场信息的不对称现实中,主体的理性选择恰恰是投机行为,从而削弱双赢的达成和合件解出现的机会;此外大量同一、简单的商事行为的反复博奕,从大视野角度来看是无意义的。因此有必要由商法实现商事关系稳定性,结构一致性,商行为规范性,进程连续性,交易行为及其结果可预测性和财产权利安全性。
最后是保障交易的可靠性和公平性。这一要求反映了商事交易的社会属性。诚然,每一企业、每一商人都希望以最小之投入、最快之速度、最高之保障获取最大之利润,商场犹如战场,竞争如荼,风险如炽,机遇如丝,但它容不得尔虞我诈、巧取豪夺、坑蒙拐骗、显失公平,而崇尚诚实信用、平等交易,并创立了诸如情势变更、危险分担、和解救济、公平竞争等具体制度,以求最大限度地实现公平交易,防止和消除不公平、不正当、不诚实行为给交易各方带来的不合理损害。迄今为止我国颁布的诸多商事、民事法律中,其中就有不少是关于保障交易行为的可靠性和公平性的。12而其对应的价值要求是商法的效益价值。商法的效益价值是商法的目标价值,是统率自由价值和秩序价值的终极价值。自由价值和秩序价值是对具有对立性的价值,解决二者之冲突的有效途径是寻求更高阶位的价值来调谐、界定、平衡二者。如前论述,理性的主体不是为了自由而自由行为,追求效益最大化才是其根本目标;同样,商事主体认同接受外在秩序的约束也是实现效益最大化的过程中的理性选择,因此商法的效益自由秩序的之间关系是商法秩序价值是实现商法效益价值的外部环境,“商法自由价值是达成商法效益价值的内在动力,而科学的商法价值体系是以效益价值为终极价值,自由价值、秩序价值为工具价值的协调统一的有机系统。”13
顺利、可靠、安全,通过对商法基本精神的剖析,我们可以发现一条永恒的规律:“社会资源的最优配置会导致社会政治、经济、文化结构的变革,并推动人类文明的发展。商事法正是在此意义上,通过保障交易的顺利、可靠、安全,达到优化配置社会资源。”14中世纪商法的形成,有其当时极为广阔和深刻的社会经济及历史文化背景,商业发达尽管形成了人们并不十分情愿接受的商人特殊阶层,但商业的发达毕竟更带来了社会的极大繁荣、社会财富的极大增加、国家实力的极大增强,并荫及社会公众和整个国家。“由是观之,商人阶层这一完全有别于封建社会经济条件下的经济生活主体的新型利益集团的出现是商品经济发展的产物,而商人阶层独立立法权和司法权的谋取既是向阻碍商品经济发展的封建法律的挑战,也是促进商品经济向高层次发展的历史契机。”15
我们应当看到,顺利、可靠、安全这一商事法的基本精神不仅推动了商业的发展,而且在更深层次上促进新兴资产阶级的壮大。而每一次资本主义经济的发展也必然影响商法的演进,两者形成有益的互动关系,所谓的相映成趣、相得益彰,即是如此。而文化、教育、文明的昌盛则伴随着经济的发展,自然而然地产生了,这一进步的终极功效,便是对人的价值的尊重。就本质而言,歧视、特权、压迫是和商法本质格格不入的,商法的发展始终和人类文明的发展紧密相连。“我们可以说,在顺利、可靠、安全这一字眼下掩藏的是平等、自由、价值、尊严。商事法的发展史也是一部人类文明的发展史,人的价值、尊严的发展史。”16
商法的精神——从过去到现在,再到未来。"在封建自然经济解体之前,商法只能以习惯法、商人自治法的形式存在。商人习惯法上升为国家制定法的内在因素,在于商品经济社会的建立和发展。商法是适应调整商事关系的需要而存在的,也是适应调整商事关系的发展而不断更新和完善的。"17尽管我们无法预计二十一世纪中国的商法典将会怎样,但有一点可以确信——商法的精神,决定着商法的存在。


1 当然,关于“法的精神”到底是什么,学者颇有争论,但本文的论述重点不在于此,因此不再赘言,权以此充之
2 《汉书》(下)
3 王保数主编,《中国商事法》,第6页,人民法院出版社
4 范宏瑞,《顺利、可靠、安全——从商事法的发展历程诠释商事法的基本精神》,摘自http://www.law-lib.com/
5《不列颠百科全书》(国际中文版)第9卷,第504页,中国大百科全书出版社1999年版
6 史际春、陈岳琴著,《论商法》,载《中国法学》2001年第4期。尽管文中作者的观点与本文是完全对立的,但其某些对历史的分析还是可取的。
7 当时具有特殊身份的人都有专门的法,如神职人员和信徒有教会法,封建主和农民有庄园法等
8 史际春、陈岳琴著,《论商法》,载《中国法学》2001年第4期
9 刘凯湘,《论商法的性质、依据与特征》,载《现代法学》1997年第5期
10范宏瑞,《顺利、可靠、安全——从商事法的发展历程诠释商事法的基本精神》,摘自http://www.law-lib.com/
11王保数主编,《中国商事法》,第25页,人民法院出版社
12如我国《破产法》第35条规定:人民法院受理破产案件前六个月至破产宣告之日的期间内,破产企业的下列行为无效:隐匿、私分或者无偿转让财产,非正常压价出售财产,对原来没有财产担保的债务提供财产担保;对未到期的债务提前清偿;放弃自己的债权
13闫海,《自由、秩序、效益——论商法价值体系的建构》,摘北大法律信息网
14范宏瑞,《顺利、可靠、安全——从商事法的发展历程诠释商事法的基本精神》,摘自http://www.law-lib.com/
15刘凯湘,《论商法的性质、依据与特征》,载《现代法学》1997年第5期
16范宏瑞,《顺利、可靠、安全——从商事法的发展历程诠释商事法的基本精神》,摘自http://www.law-lib.com/
17钱玉林,《商法的价值、功能及其定位——兼于史际春、陈岳琴商榷》,载《中国法学》2001年第5期